

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10870 01 OF 02 091650Z

65 42

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 NEA-07 SP-02

L-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 ACDA-10 SAJ-01 SAM-01 AF-04

H-03 /065 W

----- 076873

R 091540Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6170

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 10870

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, XF,

SUBJECT: PONOMAREV VIEWS ON DETENTE, MIDDLE EAST, ECPC

1. SUMMARY. FRED WARNER NEAL HAS ASKED THAT FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS JUNE 17 TALKS WITH PONOMAREV BE STRICTLY PROTECTED. PONOMAREV PROJECTED CONCERN OVER THE ARMS RACE, DEFENSIVENESS ON SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION, HELPLESSNESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND A STODGY APPROACH TO INTRA-COMMUNIST ISSUES. ALL ARE STANDARD, BUT OF INTEREST AS ILLUSTRATION OF HOW HIGH-LEVEL SOVIETS THINK. END SUMMARY.

2. PROFESSOR FRED WARNER NEAL HAS MADE AVAILABLE BY LETTER TO THE AMBASSADOR HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS JUNE 17 KREMLIN SESSION WITH CPSU CC CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER PONOMAREV WITH THE REQUEST THAT INFO BE STRICTLY PROTECTED. IT IS REPORTED AS OF GENERAL INTEREST ON HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET THINKING CONCERNING VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. SESSION LASTED TWO HOURS; ALSO PRESENT WERE CPSU CC SECRETARIAT AMERICA DESK OFFICIAL N.N. MOSTOVETS AND SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM INTERNATIONAL SECTION OFFICIAL D. MURAVIEV.

3. ON OPPOSITION TO DETENTE IN U.S., NEAL SAID IT WAS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10870 01 OF 02 091650Z

BASED ON WIDESPREAD COLD WAR ATTITUDES REFLECTED IN

DEEP SUSPICION OF USSR, BUT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO HELP OVERCOME IT. THREE POINTS ARE INVARIABLY RAISED.

4. THE FIRST IS SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON JEWISH EMIGRATION. PONOMAREV REPLIED HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, BUT SITUATION IN USSR IS MUCH EXAGGERATED IN U.S. IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT MATTER ALSO INVOLVES BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB POLICIES, WHICH COMPLICATES IT FOR SOVIETS.

5. SECOND, THERE IS THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP. PONOMAREV REPLIED THAT WHILE THIS IS MUCH DISTORTED BY ENEMIES OF DETENTE, SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP OF COURSE EXISTS. IT EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES. IT IS STUPID AND TERRIBLE. FOR THE SOVIETS IT INTERFERES WITH INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, AND HE WAS SURE THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR THE U.S., EVEN THOUGH U.S. IS MORE DEVELOPED. IT IS ALSO DANGEROUS. FOR MOST OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD, THE U.S. HAS BEEN AHEAD; IT HAS ALWAYS INITIATED NEW ARMS DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE THEN BEEN FORCED TO FOLLOW SUIT. THE SOVIETS WANT AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. TO STOP ALL NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THEN BEGIN TO REDUCE. SOVIETS ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO SECURITY: THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED WAR MORE TERRIBLY THAN ANY OTHER PEOPLE, WHILE AMERICANS HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED WAR ON THEIR HOME TERRITORY. THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT THE PROPOSALS BREZHNEV MADE AT THE 25TH CONGRESS: WE SHOULD FREEZE MILITARY BUDGETS, AND THEN BEGIN TO REDUCE BOTH BUDGETS AND ARMAMENTS. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO STOP THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS.

6. THIRD, NEAL SAID, THERE IS CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET POLICY OF ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, WITH ANGOLA THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE. PONOMAREV RESPONDED THAT THERE IS A GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL SOVIET POLICY AND THE WAY IT IS PORTRAYED. SOVIETS ARE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOR OF FREE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FORCES. THEY WILL DEVELOP ANYWAY; IT IS AN OBJECTIVE PROCESS. IT IS A MATTER  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10870 01 OF 02 091650Z

OF NOT LOSING INFLUENCE BY APPEARING NOT TO UNDERSTAND THIS INEVITABLE DEVELOPMENT, RATHER THAN OF EXPANDING SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE SOVIETS ALSO FEEL IT IS A MORAL ISSUE. THE U.S. WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF UNDERSTOOD THAT NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WILL DEVELOP NO MATTER WHAT. BUT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF EXPORTING REVOLUTION: IT DOES NOT WORK, AND THEY ARE AGAINST IT IN PRINCIPLE. THIS WAS THE BASIS OF

THEIR CONFRONTATION WITH THE CHINESE. "BELIEVE ME," PONOMAREV SAID, "WE" WILL GO FAR TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. ON THIS ISSUE, AND OTHER ISSUES. ON ANGOLA, THEY HAD SUPPORTED THE MPLA FOR SOME TIME BECAUSE THEY WERE CONVINCED THE MPLA WAS A TRUE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE ONLY ONE TRULY REPRESENTING THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE, BUT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF TELLING THE ANGOLANS HOW TO MANAGE THEIR AFFAIRS OR OF HAVING THEM PUT A COMMUNIST PARTY IN POWER.

7. IN LONG DISCUSSION OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, NEAL REPORTS THAT PONOMAREV DID MOST OF THE TALKING, WAS GENERALLY WELL-INFORMED BUT UNCLEAR ON CONVENTION MECHANICS, ASSUMED FORD AND CARTER WOULD BE THE CANDIDATES, AND WAS CURIOUS ABOUT VICE PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE. ACCORDING TO NEAL, PONOMAREV SEEMED SURPRISED AS NEAL'S VIEW THAT SECRETARY WOULD LEAVE EVEN IF PRESIDENT REELECTED.

8. WHEN NEAL SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF A JOINT UNOFFICIAL MEETING, NEXT YEAR, OF SENATE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (S) OF ONE OF BOTH HOUSES OF SUPREME SOVIETS, OR (PREFERABLY) OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, PONOMAREV SAID HE WAS ALL FOR IT, IN WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW OR BOTH. HE ASKED NEAL TO DISCUSS IDEA WITH SOME SENATORS AND WRITE HIM DIRECTLY IN KEWMLIN ABOUT IT.

9. ON NEAL'S OWN COMMITTEE, PONOMAREV SAID SOVIETS CONSIDER ITS FORMATION AND WORK VERY IMPORTANT AND HOPE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IT; HE UNDERSTOOD COMMITTEE WAS CONCERNED WITH AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS, BUT THOUGHT IT HAD "AN OBJECTIVE VIEW".

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10870 01 OF 02 091650Z

10. ON MIDDLE EAST, PONOMAREV REPORTEDLY SAID SOVIETS CANNOT ABDICATE THEIR POSITION, BUT HAVE TRIED TO COOPERATE IN ALL EFFORTS FOR SETTLEMENT. THEY HAVE URGED RESTRAINT ON THE ARABS, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS COST THEM SOME INFLUENCE. THEY HAD ALWAYS SAID THEY DID NOT THINK THE KISSINGER PIECEMEAL APPROACH WOULD WORK, BUT HAD NOT PUT OBSTACLES IN ITS PATH. THEY FEEL THE U.S. HAS NOT RECIPROCATED THEIR OFFERS OF COOPERATION. THEY UNDERSTAND THIS PARTY REFLECTS DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE U.S., BUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IS VERY DANGEROUS. THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO VERY FAR IN COOPERATING WITH THE U.S., AND THEY FEEL A SETTLEMENT CAN ONLY COME FROM JOINT U.S. - SOVIET EFFORTS. THEIR PROPOSAL TO OFFER JOINT GUARANTEES, EITHER WITH THE U.S. ALONE OR WITH OTHER NATIONS TOO,

TO ALL PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST STILL STANDS. THEY DO  
NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. DOES NOT TELL THE ISRAELI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10870 02 OF 02 091639Z

65 42

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 NEA-07 SP-02

L-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 ACDA-10 SAJ-01 SAM-01 AF-04

H-01 /063 W

----- 076801

R 091540Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6171

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 10870

LIMDIS

GOVERNMENT WHAT A GOOD PROPOSAL THIS IS.

11. NEAL ASKED ABOUT ECPC (A WEEK BEFORE FINAL PREPARATORY SESSION). PONOMAREV REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS, BUT THERE WERE STILL PROBLEMS TO BE WORKED OUT. SOVIETS WANT A COMMON POINT OF VIEW ON IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS, OR AT LEAST THE MORE IMPORTANT ONES. THEY CANNOT DICTATE TO THE OTHER PARTIES, AND THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO HARMONIZE THEM. THE CPSU CAN ALSO GIVE IDEOLOGICAL ADVICE, BASED ON ITS LONGER EXPERIENCE. CP'S IN FRANCE AND ITALY, PARTIES NOT IN POWER, BEST UNDERSTAND THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THEIR COUNTRIES, ON THE OTHER HAND, AND ARE TRYING TO HARMONIZE IDEOLOGY WITH THE PRACTICALITIES OF THE INTERNAL SITUATIONS AT HOME. ALL THIS, HOWEVER, IS A MATTER FOR THE COMMUNISTS MOVEMENT, AND SHOULD NOT BE A CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE AREA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

12. COMMENT. PONOMAREV TOOK A STANDARD LINE ON ALMOST EVERY ISSUE, AS MIGH BE EXPECTED. NEVERTHELESS, TALK IS OF INTEREST IN GENERAL AS REFLECTION OF THE WAY SOVIETS THINK AT THIS LEVEL, AND IN PARTICULAR ON

FOLLOWING POINTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10870 02 OF 02 091639Z

--HE PAINTED MILITARY BUILDUP AS A SERIOUS FACT OF  
LIFE ON BOTH SIDES, AND SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT STOPPING  
IT, BEGINNING WITH NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS, IF ONLY BECAUSE  
OF WHAT IT DOES TO THEIR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT;

--HIS CLAIM THAT SOVIETS SUPPORT NATIONAL LIBERATION  
MOVEMENTS TO MAINTAIN, RATHER THAN EXTEND, INFLUENCE IS  
USUAL SELF-SERVING SOVIET ASSERTION;

--IMPRESSION OF HELPLESSNESS ON MIDDLE EAST, AND  
PLEA FOR JOINT U.S. - SOVIET SOLUTION, RINGS VERY TRUE,  
AND IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH KORNIYENKO'S LINE;

--LINE ON ECPC -- "A COMMON POINT OF VIEW ON AT  
LEAST MOST IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS"THROUGH  
HARMONIZATION, HOPEFULLY WITHOUT ANY EFFECT ON "INTER-  
NATIONAL POLITICS" -- IS CHARACTERISTIC OF OLD-FASHIONED  
APPROACH ASSOCIATED WITH PONOMAREV.  
MATLOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DETENTE, PERSONAL OPINION, COMMUNIST MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 09 JUL 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976MOSCOW10870  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X4  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760265-0621  
**From:** MOSCOW  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760774/aaaacndd.tel  
**Line Count:** 250  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 MAY 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 MAY 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <04 MAY 2004 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PONOMAREV VIEWS ON DETENTE, MIDDLE EAST, ECPC  
**TAGS:** PFOR, UR, US, XF, (PONOMAREV), (NEAL, FRED WARNER)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006